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Pennsylvania's Prevailing Wage Act: An
Appropriate Target for ERISA Preemption

I.

Introduction

In 1961, Pennsylvania adopted the Prevailing Wage Act
(PWA)' to protect workers employed on public projects from
receiving substandard wages.2 To achieve this goal, the PWA
provides that contractors retained by the Commonwealth to
perform certain construction or repair work must pay their workers
the prevailing minimum wage rate for the locality in which the
work is performed.' The prevailing minimum wage rate represents
the payment of both cash wages and fringe benefits to workers on
public projects.4
The inclusion of the fringe benefits component in the prevailing wage has prompted litigation over whether the PWA is
preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).5 ERISA was designed to establish the regulation
of pension and employee welfare benefit plans as an exclusively
federal concern6 and, in doing so, to promote the growth of
employee benefit plans by subjecting employers to a uniform set of
regulations designed to protect the rights of employees and their
beneficiaries.7 To accomplish this goal, Congress included in
ERISA a broad preemption provision,8 which was intended to
strike down state laws that would subject employers to numerous

1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43. §§ 165-1 to -11 (1961).
2. See Duffy v. Department of Labor & Indus., 634 A.2d 734, 735 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993).

3.
4.
5.
6.
ERISA,
7.
8.

For a discussion of the specific provisions of the PWA, see infra part IV.
34 PA. CODE § 9.102 (1975) (defining prevailing minimum wage rate).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-61 (1994).
See William J. Kilberg & Catherine L. Heron, The Preemption of State Law Under
1979 DUKE L.J. 383, 386.
See id. at 386-88.
29 U.S.C. § 1144; see infra part III.B.
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and conflicting requirements in maintaining employee benefit
plans.9 In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit rescued the PWA from federal preemption
under ERISA. This decision places Pennsylvania among numerous
jurisdictions that have confronted the issue of whether their
prevailing wage laws, in whole or in part, are preempted by ERISA
because their requirements force employers to comply with
conflicting and multitudinous regulations regarding the maintenance
of their employee benefit plans in contravention to the intent of
ERISA.
This Comment addresses Pennsylvania's PWA and the Third
Circuit's decision to shield the Act from ERISA's preemption
provisions. Part II provides a background on prevailing wage laws
and includes a discussion of the federal prevailing wage law, which
has contributed both the policy rationale and explicit provisions in
various states' prevailing wage laws. This section further examines
the advantages and criticisms of prevailing wage laws and the
source of controversy with respect to ERISA preemption. Part III
provides a basic overview of ERISA's regulatory and preemption
provisions. Part IV discusses Pennsylvania's PWA and the specific
provisions that have invoked ERISA preemption analysis. Part V
examines the decisions of the District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit on the issue of ERISA
preemption of the PWA. This discussion suggests that, despite
what appears to be the direct conflict between the PWA and the
provisions of ERISA, the Third Circuit's decision regarding
preemption was too narrow in scope in light of the congressional
intent behind ERISA and the decisions of other jurisdictions that
have examined this issue. Part VII addresses how other jurisdictions have dealt with the issue of ERISA preemption of their
prevailing wage laws and how these decisions will affect
Pennsylvania. This section concludes that because of the differing
outcomes in jurisdictions throughout the United States, some
congressional response is necessary to resolve this issue. Finally,
Part VIII contains an overview of legislation that was introduced
in Congress, which attempted to address these inconsistent

9. See David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in
Effective Federalism, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 427, 454-58 (1987).
10. Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders and Contractors, v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945 (3d
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 2244 (Mar. 29, 1995).
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decisions. This section will discuss the shortcomings of that bill,
which died in Congress, with the expectation that Congress will
undoubtedly offer another bill to attempt to settle the ERISA
preemption controversy surrounding prevailing wage laws.
II.

Prevailing Wage Laws

A. Federal Law: The Davis-Bacon Act
In 1931, the federal government passed the Davis-Bacon
Act," the principal federal prevailing wage law and the federal
government's first attempt to apply federal wage standards to
nongovernment workers.12 The Act was designed to protect local
contractors who bid on federal construction projects from being
underbid by contractors from other areas with cheaper sources of
labor. 13 These outside contractors were able to offer the lowest
bids on federal construction projects "by taking advantage of widespread unemployment in the construction industry and hiring
workers at substandard wages, often bringing a low-paid crew in
from distant areas."14 These practices created two major problems. First, they undermined the goals of the federal construction
program, which included distributing federal employment and
money evenly throughout the country. 5 Second, the lower wage
rate resulted in "labor strife and [in] broken contracts by contractors who speculated on the labor market unwisely, thus preventing16
'the most economical and orderly granting of Government contracts."'
Congressional response to these problems resulted in the
Under this Act,
passage of the original Davis-Bacon Act. 7
11. 40 U.S.C. § 276 (1931).
12. Armand J. Thieblot, Jr., Prevailing Wage Legislation: The Davis-Bacon Act, State
"Little Davis-Bacon" Acts, the Walsh-Healey Act, and the Service Contract Act, Labor
Relations and Public Policy Series No. 27 (1986), at 25.
13. See Joseph A. Hackenbracht, Has Time Come To Remove Government Controls To
Let Marketplace Determine FairLabor Costs?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 14, 1992, at 9;
see also Thieblot, supranote 12, at 29-30 (noting that while this was the "stated philosophical
underpinning of the prevailing wage concept and the Davis Bacon Act." other motivations,
such as fear of losing jobs to African Americans and attempts "to bolster the status of the
union movement," contributed to the Act's passage).
14. Building & Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 712 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984).
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 332, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 8 (1935)).
17. Davis-Bacon Act, ch. 411, § 1, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931). The original Act provided:

That every contract in excess of $5000 in amount, to which the United States or
the District of Columbia is a party, which requires or involves the employment of
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employers who bid on public projects were required to pay their
workers the prevailing wage rate for work of a "similar nature" in
that locality.t8 This original Act was plagued by vagueness and
attacked for its lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and the
absence of a predetermined wage rate on which contractors could
base their bids on public projects.19 As a result, in 1935, Congress
amended the Act to include both enforcement provisions and a
predetermined prevailing wage rate established by the Secretary of
Labor.2" Hence, the current Act requires that all specifications for
contracts over $2000 to which the United States or District of
Columbia is a party must contain a provision promising to pay
certain classes of workers minimum wages similar to the wages
"determined by the Secretary of Labor to be prevailing for the
corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics employed on
projects of a character similar to the contract work in the city,
town, village, or other civil subdivision of the state, in which the
work is to be performed ....
Another important amendment to the Davis-Bacon Act was
added in 1964, which made fringe benefits an integral part of the
prevailing wage concept.22 This amendment provided that the
prevailing wage should include not only the prevailing cash wage
for workers in a certain classification and locality, but also the
prevailing fringe benefits paid to these workers. In his comprehen-

laborers or mechanics in the construction, alteration, and/or repair of any public
buildings of the United States or the District of Columbia within the geographical
limits of the States of the Union or the District of Columbia, shall contain a
provision to the effect that the rate of wage for all laborers and mechanics
employed by the contractor or any subcontractor on the public buildings covered
by the contract shall not be less than the prevailing rate of wages for work of a
similar nature in the city, town, village, or other civil division of the State in which
the public buildings are located, or in the District of Columbia if the public
buildings are located there, and a further provision that in case any dispute arises
as to what are the prevailing rates of wages for work of a similar nature applicable
to the contract which can not be adjusted by the contracting officer, the matter
shall be referred to the Secretary of Labor for determination and his decision
thereon shall be conclusive on all parties to the contract: Provided, That in case
of national emergency the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this
Act.
Id.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Thieblot, supra note 12, at 31-32; see also Donovan, 712 F.2d at 614.
See Thieblot, supra note 12, at 33 (discussing 1935 amendments to Davis-Bacon).
Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1994).
See Thiebolt, supra note 12, at 34.
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sive study of prevailing wage laws, Armand Thieblot, Jr. argues that
the addition of fringe benefits to the prevailing wage signalled a
shift in the Davis-Bacon policy:
Fringe benefits were not added to the prevailing wage concept
in order to protect local wage standards from competitive
pressures, or to keep itinerant contractors out of the local
construction market. They were added to eliminate an area of
competitive advantage enjoyed by nonunion firms. This is the
first open public expression of a new agenda for Davis-Bacon,
that of promoting unionism in the construction industry by
shielding unionized
firms from the consequences of their higher
23
labor costs.
This criticism of the Davis-Bacon Act has called into question
the continued viability of the Davis-Bacon Act, and a bill in
Congress proposing to repeal the Act is currently gaining cosponsors. 24
Despite the aforementioned advantages of the Act,
supporters of the repeal contend that the Act has become outdated
and argue that numerous labor laws have been enacted since the
Act was passed in 1931 which offer protection to workers on public
projects.' In addition, supporters contend that repealing the Act
will save millions of dollars in compliance costs for contractors who
must comply with the record keeping requirements of DavisBacon.2 6 Moreover, repealing the Act would decrease the costs
attributed to federal agencies "which must collect, process, and
disseminate thousands of wage rates., 27 Finally, supporters argue
that the Act should be repealed because of incidences of fraud that
have accompanied the determination of prevailing wage rates in
certain areas. 8

23. Id. at 35. For an extensive discussion of the administrative problems, policy
considerations, economic impact, and challenges to the Davis-Bacon Act, see Thieblot, supra
note 12, at 52-135.
24. H.R. REP. 500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Several other members of Congress,
who do not support a repeal of the Davis-Bacon Act, have proposed another bill, which
would significantly amend the Act by, among other things, raising the contract threshold
from $2000 to $100,000 for new construction projects and $15,000 for alterations, repairs, and
renovations. H.R. REP. 937, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
25. 141 CONG. REC. H9647-04 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cass
Ballenger).
26. Id. (noting that compliance costs for the construction industry currently total nearly
$100 million per year).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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B. State Prevailing Wage Laws
Despite the controversy surrounding the continued importance
and applicability of the Davis-Bacon Act, thirty-one states currently
apply some version of a prevailing wage law.29 Although seven
states had enacted prevailing wage laws prior to the passage of the
Davis-Bacon Act,3" few of these early laws contained the traditional prevailing wage concept as codified under the Davis-Bacon
Act.3
Instead, many of these laws merely provided for the
32
implementation of an eight-hour work day and overtime pay.
Following the enactment of the Davis-Bacon Act, however,
numerous states passed prevailing wage laws, which, to some
degree, are based on the federal prevailing wage concept.3 While
the explicit provisions of prevailing wage laws vary greatly from
state to state,34 the scope and purpose of these laws is remarkably
similar.
In general, prevailing wage laws serve four primary functions.
First, they assure that workers on public worksites do not accept
wages lower than those paid to workers on private construction
projects in the same locality.35 Second, prevailing wage laws
"protect local wage standards by preventing contractors from
basing their bids for public works on wages and benefits lower than
those prevailing in the area .... ,36 These laws prevent out-ofstate employers with lower costs from undercutting the bids of local
employers. Third, prevailing wage laws "help ensure that public
29. These states include Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. ERISA Preemptionof State PrevailingWage Laws: Hearings
on S. 1580 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1580] (statement of Robert Georgine,
President of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO).
30. Thieblot, supra note 12, at 138. These states included Kansas, New York, Idaho,
Arizona, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Nebraska. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 141, 142.
34. For a thorough analysis of the differing provisions of state prevailing wage laws, see
id. at 137-205.
35. Hearings on S. 1580, supra note 29 (statement of John F. Hudacs, New York State
Labor Commissioner testifying for the National Association of Government Labor Officials).
36. Legislative Hearing on H.R. 1036: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on LaborManagement Relations of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1993)
[hereinafter Hearing on H. R. 1036] (statement of Robert A. Georgine).
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work projects are built to high standards by a highly skilled and
well-trained labor force."37 Finally, prevailing wage laws protect
local employees from unemployment by preventing contractors
from "recruiting labor from distant cheap labor areas."38
Despite these considerations,39 critics contend that prevailing
wage laws have detrimental effects on non-union companies, since
prevailing wages and benefits are often determined by examining
the union wage in a certain locality.4 As a result, non-union
contractors who have entered into employment contracts that set
a benefits or wage level may be forced to pay additional wages if
their plans do not comply with benefits plans included in the
prevailing wage. These contractors are virtually excluded from the
bidding process for public works projects since bidding on these
projects would require contractors to pay wages or provide benefits
that they may not be able to afford. Furthermore, critics argue that
prevailing wage laws are inefficient because they tend to make
construction projects more costly due to the higher wage rate
required under these acts.41 In addition, contractors who are
forced to pay what is essentially a union wage will command a
higher level of skill for their employees, which may have detrimental effects on young people, women, and minorities who may not
have the opportunity to participate in union-style training programs.42 These detrimental effects upon non-union contractors
and minority groups have called into question the continued need
for and validity of prevailing wage laws.
This Comment focuses on yet another criticism of prevailing
wage laws: their apparent conflict with the goals of ERISA and the

37. Hearings on S. 1580, supra note 29 (statement of John F. Hudacs).
38. Local Union 598, Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeymen & Apprentices Training
Fund v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1988), affd meme., 488 U.S. 881
(1988).
39. Supporters of prevailing wage laws argue that in "states that have repealed their
prevailing wage laws in the last 10 or 15 years, the absences of a wage and benefit floor
caused average wage and benefit levels in the local construction industry to fall substantially." Hearings on S. 1580, supra note 29 (statement of Frank Lally, President on North
Pennsylvania Electric, Inc.).
40. Id. (statement of Mark Thierman, Esq. testifying on behalf of the National
Association of Manufacturers).
41. See Thieblot, supra note 12, at 204-05.
42. 139 CONG. REC. S15465, pt. 2 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1993) (statement of Sen. Craig).
This entry into the Congressional Record addresses a bill that proposed to declare the DavisBacon Act unconstitutional due to its disparate impact on minorities in employment.
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effects of decisions like that in Pennsylvania, which shield these
laws from ERISA preemption.
III. ERISA and ERISA Preemption
A. The ERISA Regulatory Provisions
In 1974, Congress adopted ERISA in response to the tremen43
dous growth in size and complexity of employee benefit plans.
Congress found that despite the widespread use of employee
benefit plans,44 many employees and beneficiaries of employee
benefit plans were deprived of their anticipated benefits due to the
lack of adequate funding or vesting requirements and general
mismanagement of employee benefit plans.45 As a result, Congress developed ERISA to secure the financial soundness of
employee benefit plans and to assure the growth of such plans
through the use of tax advantages and "the negative inducement of
avoidance of multitudinous state laws" regulating employee benefit
46

plans.

43. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
44. An employee benefit plan is defined as "an employee welfare benefit plan or an
employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and
an employee pension benefit plan." Id. § 1002. Employee welfare benefit plans include
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs,
or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services ....
Id. Section 1002 defines an employee pension benefit plan as a plan that
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the
method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing
benefits from the plan.
Id.
45. Id. § 1001. Employee benefit plans that are covered under ERISA's provisions
include plans established or maintained "(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any
industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any employee organization or organizations
representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce; or (3) by both." 29 U.S.C. § 1003.
46. William J. Kilberg & Catherine L. Heron, The Preemption of State Laws Under
ERISA, 1979 DUKE L. J. 383, 388.
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ERISA's regulatory scheme is divided into five parts, each to
be administered by the United States Secretary of Labor. Parts
One and Four apply to both employee welfare benefit plans and
employee pension plans and allocate certain obligations to
administrators of employee benefit plans subject to ERISA.4 7
Parts Two and Three apply exclusively to employee pension plans
and apply minimum standards for funding, vesting, participation,
and benefit accrual under such plans.' Part Five contains the
administrative and enforcement provisions, including the ERISA
preemption provisions.49 A basic summary of each of these
regulatory provisions follows.
1.

PartOne of ERISA.

-Part

One of ERISA's regulatory

provisions contains the reporting and disclosure requirements for
employee benefit plans. To comply with these provisions, 0 the
administrator of an employee benefit plan has a duty to furnish
certain information about the plan to the Secretary of Labor, the
plan's participants, and the plan's beneficiaries.5 Specifically, the
administrator is required to file a summary plan description, the
plan description, modifications and changes to the plan, an annual
report of the plan, and terminal and supplementary reports with the
Secretary of Labor.52 In addition, the administrator must furnish
participants and beneficiaries of an employee benefit plan with a
summary plan description, statements and schedules of the plan,

47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31; id. § 1101-14.
48. Id. §§ 1051-1051; id. §§ 1081-1086.
49. Id. §§ 1131-1145.
50. Section 1024 includes the specific administrative requirements for the filing of an
annual report, plan description, summary plan description and modifications to the plan with
the Secretary of Labor, as well as the requirements for publication of the summary plan
description and annual report to the participants and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans.
29 U.S.C. § 1024. The specific information to be included in a plan or summary plan
description appears under section 1022 and includes such information as the plan's eligibility
for participation under ERISA, circumstances that may result in disqualification and
procedures to be followed in presenting claims for benefits. Id. § 1022 (2)(b). The annual
report is to include a financial statement, which describes the plans assets and liabilities,
changes in the fund balance and changes in financial position. Id. § 1023 (b)(1). In addition,
the report must include the number of employees covered under the plan and persons who
received compensation under the plan for services rendered and may be required to include
an actuarial statement and statement from an insurance company, which sells or guarantees
plan benefits. Id.
§ 1023 (c), (d), (e).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1021.

52. Id. § 1021(b).
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and a statement of the total benefits and nonforfeitable pension
benefits that have accrued if the participant or beneficiary requests
such information.5 3
2. PartFourof ERISA. -Part Four of ERISA's regulatory provisions requires that each employee benefit plan established
and maintained must name one or more fiduciaries who are
responsible for the operation and administration of the plan. 4
The fiduciary is required to undertake his or her duties "with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a
like character and with like aims."55 In addition to the duties and
liabilities of the fiduciary, Part Four enumerates the requisite
components of an employee benefit plan. 6 These include providing a procedure for establishing and carrying out a funding policy,
describing procedures under the plan for allocating responsibilities
for the administration and operation of the plan, providing a
procedure for amending the plan, and specifying the basis upon
which payments to and from the plan are made.5 7
3. Part Two of ERISA. -Part Two of ERISA, which
pertains specifically to employee pension plans, sets out the
minimum participation, vesting, and benefit accrual standards for
such plans. 8 Section 1052 of ERISA describes the minimum
years of service and age requirements for employees to participate
in an employee benefit plan. 9 To satisfy the minimum vesting
requirements, which are contained in section 1053, a pension plan
must provide "that an employee's right to his normal retirement
benefit is nonforfeitable upon the attainment of normal retirement
age .... "6 In addition, the plan must provide that an employee's
right to the accrued benefit under the plan to which he or she has
contributed are nonforfeitable. 61
An employee benefit plan

53. Id. § 1021(a).
54. Id. §.1102(a)(1).

55. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
56.
57.
58.
59.

29 U.S.C. § 1102(b).
Id.
Id. §§ 1052-54.
Id. § 1052.

60. Id. § 1053(a).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a)(1).
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further satisfies the vesting requirements of ERISA if, after five
years of service, the employee has a right to one hundred percent
of the accrued benefit from employer contributions to the plan, or
if an employee has a right to a percentage of the accrued benefit
after a minimum of three years of service.62 Also, Part Two
contains benefit accrual requirements for employee pension plans,
which are listed in section 1054.63

4. Part Three of ERISA. -Employee pension plans must
meet the additional requirement, enumerated in Part Three of
ERISA's regulatory provisions. 6
This part establishes the
minimum funding standards for ERISA pension plans during a plan
year. Pension plans under this section "shall establish and maintain
a funding standard account," which is credited and charged as
provided under section 1082.65 Part Three also lists the circumstances under which variance from the minimum funding requirements enumerated in section 1082 will be tolerated.66
5. Part Five of ERISA. -The regulatory provisions contained in Part Five assure the effectiveness and administration of
67
the preceding sections with respect to employee benefit plans.
Sections 1131 and 1132 list the various criminal and civil penalties
for violation of the various regulatory provisions, as well as the
procedure for undertaking civil enforcement of those provisions.'
In addition, Part Five contains a broad preemption provision, the
62. Id. § 1053(a)(2)(A) & (B).
63. Id. § 1054.
64. Id. §§ 1081-86.
65. Id. § 1082.

66. Under section 1083, the Secretary of the Treasury may waive the requirements
under section 1082 if the secretary determines that an employer is "unable to satisfy the
minimum funding standard for a plan year without temporary substantial business hardship
(substantial business hardship in the case of a multi-employer plan) and if application of the
standard would be adverse to the interests of plan participants in the aggregate .... " 29

U.S.C.A. § 1083(a) (West Supp. 1996). To determine whether an employer is suffering
temporary business hardship, the Secretary may consider whether:
(1) the employer is operating at an economic loss,
(2) there is substantial unemployment or underemployment in the trade or
business and in the industry concerned.
(3) the sales and profits of the industry concerned are depressed or declining, and
(4) it is reasonable to expect that the plan will be continued only if the waiver is

granted.
Id.§ 1083(b) (West Supp. 1996).
67. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-45.
68. Id.§§ 1131, 1132.
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interpretation of which has been the subject of much controversy
and criticism since its inception.69
B. ERISA Preemption
To assure the exclusive federal regulation of employee benefit
plans,7 ° ERISA contains a broad preemption provision which
provides: "[T]he provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III
of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section
1003(b) of this title."7 The Supreme Court articulated Congress's
preemption provision in Fort
rationale for establishing ERISA's
72
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne:
The most efficient way [to maintain employee benefit plans] is
to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a
set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and
disbursement of benefits. Such a system is difficult to achieve,
however, if a benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory

69. This Comment does not attempt to provide an extensive analysis of ERISA
preemption. For articles specifically addressing ERISA preemption of state laws, see Kilberg
& Heron, supra note 46 (concluding that although congressional intent seems clear, further
clarification is needed to determine the interplay between traditional areas of state law and
congressional objectives under ERISA with respect to preemption of state laws); William J.
Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemptionof State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An
Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1313 (1984) (proposing that courts should
move away from the application of troublesome tests developed to analyze ERISA
preemption and toward a test that would examine whether a state's apparent purpose was
to regulate employee benefit plans to determine preemption). See also David Gregory, The
Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. Prr. L.
REV. 427 (1987); William Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Laws That Do and
Laws That Do Not Relate to Employee Benefit Plans, 19 FORUM 169 (1983).
70. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Labor, Senator Jacob Javits
remarked:
Although the desirability of further regulation-at either the State or Federal level-undoubtedly warrants further attention, on balance, the emergence of a
comprehensive and pervasive federal interest and the interests of uniformity with
respect to interstate plans required-but for certain exceptions-the displacement
of State action in the field of private employee benefit programs.
Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare: Legislative History
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4670 (1976),
cited in Kilberg & Inman, supra note 69, at 1314-15 n.5. Furthermore, in Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981), the Court found that Congress "meant
to establish' pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern..." and was able to do
so through the enactment of the preemption provision.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
72. 482 U.S. i (1987).
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requirements in differing States. A plan would be required to
keep certain records in some States but not in others; to make
certain benefits available in some States but not in others; to
process claims in a certain way in some States but not in others;
and to comply with
certain fiduciary standards in some States
73
but not in others.

In order for ERISA preemption to take effect, a state law first
must presume to regulate an employee benefit plan.74 In addition,
according to the language of the provision, these state laws must
"relate to" employee benefit plans. 75 Even if a state law meets
these conditions, however, it may be saved from ERISA preemp-

tion if it falls into specific exemptions listed in section 1144, which76
include laws that regulate banking, insurance, and securities.

Moreover, under the "savings clause," certain employee benefit
plans are explicitly exempted from the requirements of ERISA,77
and as a result, preemption analysis does not apply. Finally,
ERISA explicitly provides that federal laws are not preempted.78
The difficulty in applying the above preemption analysis lies in
the interpretation of the "relate to" language in ERISA. The
courts have struggled to find an appropriate test that will reflect the
scope of ERISA's preemption provision.79
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,s8 the United States Supreme

Court stated that ERISA's broad preemptive effect is apparent
from the statute's language and determined that a state law
"'relates to' an ERISA employee benefit plans, in the normal sense
of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a
73. Id. at 9.
74. See Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989) (rejecting defendant bank's
argument that its policy to pay discharged employees for unused vacation time out of its
general assets constituted a welfare benefit plan such that ERISA would preempt an attempt
by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to enforce its law requiring the payment of unused
vacation time when the bank did not pay those benefits).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
76. Id. § 1144(b).
77. Id. § 1003(b). These plans include governmental plans, id. § 1003(b)(1), church
plans, id. § 1003(b)(2), plans "maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable
workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation of disability insurance laws,"
id. § 1003(b)(3), plans maintained outside of the United States for the benefit of nonresident
aliens, id. § 1003(b)(4), and excess benefit plans as defined under § 1002(36), id.
§ 1003(b)(5).
78. Id. § 1144(d).
79. See Kilberg & Inman, supra note 69 for analysis of the development and short-falls
of differing ERISA preemption tests.
80. 463 U.S. 85 (1982).
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plan."81 The Shaw Court examined whether New York's Human
Rights Law, which prohibited treating pregnancy differently from
other nonoccupational disabilities in an employer's benefit plan,82
and Disability Benefits Law, which required that employers provide
employees who could not work because of nonoccupational illness
or injury the same benefits for pregnancy as for other disabilities,83 were preempted by ERISA.
To analyze these preemption issues, the Court used a two-step
inquiry: (1) whether the laws "relate to" employee benefit plans
within the meaning of the preemption provision, and (2) whether
any exemption under ERISA saves the laws from preemption. The
Court clarified that section 1144 "cannot be interpreted to pre-empt
only state laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA
84
-reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like. 1
Rather, preemption of state laws extends beyond situations in
which state laws merely conflict with the regulatory provisions of
ERISA.8 '
Thus, preemption analysis necessarily includes a
determination of whether state laws have a connection with, or
relation to, an employee benefit plan. The Court in Shaw remarked, however, that "[s]ome state actions may affect employee
benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to
warrant a finding that the law *relates to' the plan., 86 The Court
concluded that both of the laws "relate to" benefit plans because
of their requirements regarding how employers could permissively
structure their employee benefits plans and to whom certain
benefits should be paid.87
Under the second inquiry, the Court examined whether either
of these laws fit into the categories of laws exempted from ERISA
preemption. With respect to the Human Rights Law, the Court
found that ERISA preemption of the entire law would "impair
Title VII to the extent that the Human Rights Law provides a
means of enforcing Title VII's commands."8 8 However, the Court
found that "[i]nsofar as state laws prohibit employment practices

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89-90.
Kilberg & Inman, supra note 69, at 1324 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98).

85.
86.
87.
88.

Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98.
Id. at 100 n.21.
See id. at 96.
Id. at 102.
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that are lawful under Title VII ... pre-emption would not impair
Title VII within the meaning of § 514(d)."89 Thus, the Human
Rights Law was preempted only to the extent that it prohibited
practices that the federal laws permit.'
With respect to the
Disability Benefits Law, the Court noted that while the law relates
to employee benefits plans, it is not preempted to the extent that
it is an employee benefit plan "'maintained solely for the purpose
of complying with applicable ...disability insurance laws"',91 and
thus, meets an exemption under ERISA. As a result, the Court
found that the Disability Benefits Law was not preempted by
ERISA, but that "New York may not enforce its provisions
through regulation of ERISA-covered benefit plans."92
Shaw illustrates that while the breadth of ERISA preemption
is extensive, it is not all-encompassing. Thus, in Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne,93 the Court held that a Maine statute
requiring a one-time severance payment to employees following a
plant closing was not preempted by ERISA. 94 Under the Maine
statute, employers who close or relocate a plant a distance greater
than 100 miles and who employ over 100 employees would be
required to pay each employee who has worked at the plant at
least three years, one week's pay for each year of employment."
Employees who accept jobs at the new plant, or who are covered
under a contract that deals specifically with severance pay, are
ineligible for the severance payment.96
The Court examined whether this state law requirement
regarding severance pay regulated an employee benefit plan
thereby triggering ERISA preemption. The Court found that the
explicit language of the preemption provision refers to an "employee benefit plan" and not merely to "employee benefits."97 Thus,

since the Maine statute does not require an employer to establish
or maintain an employee benefit plan in order to make the
severance payment, the statute could not be said to "relate to" an

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 103.
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 108.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 109.
482 U.S. 1 (1987).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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employee benefit plan.98 The Court noted that "[t]o do little
more than write a check hardly constitutes the operation of a
benefit plan."9 9 Moreover, the Court determined that the purpose
of the preemption provision was not frustrated by the requirements
of the Maine statute. The Court stated:
Congress intended pre-emption to afford employers the
advantages of a uniform set of administrative procedures
governed by a single set of regulations. This concern only
arises, however, with respect to benefits whose provision by
nature requires an ongoing administrative program to meet the
employer's obligation. It is for this reason that Congress
pre-empted state laws relating to plans, rather than simply to
benefits. Only a plan embodies a set of administrative practices
vulnerable to the burden that would be imposed by a patchwork
scheme of regulation.' °
Thus, the Court determined that the requirement of a one-time
payment, without any on-going administrative responsibilities on
the part of the employer, does not represent the kind of regulation
of employee benefit plans intended for preemption under
1 01
ERISA.
Based upon these and other Supreme Court preemption cases,
federal courts have formulated additional tests to determine
whether state laws have a connection with, or relation to, an
ERISA plan which would invoke preemption. Hence, in United
Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown
Memorial Hospital,"2 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
enunciated the following analysis of the relate to language in the
preemption provision:
A rule of law relates to an ERISA plan if it is specifically
designed to affect employee benefit plans, if it singles out such
plans for special treatment, or if the rights or restrictions it
creates are predicated on the existence of such a plan .... This
does not end our inquiry, however. A state rule of law may be
preempted even though it has no such direct nexus with ERISA
plans if its effect is to dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA
plans with regard to their benefits, structure, reporting and

98. Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 12.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 11-12.

101. Id. at 14.
102. 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 382 (1993).

19961

PENNSYLVANIA'S PREVAILING WAGE

ACT

administration, or if allowing states to have such rules would
impair the ability of a plan to function simultaneously in a
number of states.103
In developing this test, the Third Circuit extracted rules and
analysis from a number of post-Shaw ERISA preemption cases,
which enumerated additional factors to determine whether a state
law and ERISA benefit plan have a connection or relationship that
warrants preemption.1" Different jurisdictions have emphasized
other factors in fashioning their tests of the "relate to" language of
section 1144 of ERISA. 1°5 The application of these tests with
respect to prevailing wage laws, which will be discussed in part VII
of this Comment, has led to inconsistent results in jurisdictions
outside the Third Circuit.
IV Pennsylvania's Prevailing Wage Act
A. Summary of the Basic Provisions

Pennsylvania's Prevailing Wage Act (PWA) provides: "Not
less than the prevailing minimum wages as determined hereunder
shall be paid to all workmen employed on public work.""°
Although the PWA does not contain a definition of prevailing
wages, the Act's accompanying regulations"° define prevailing
wage rates as:

"Rates ... payable in the locality in which the

public work is to be performed, for the respective crafts and
classifications, including the amount of contributions for employe
benefitst s as required by the act. '' t °9 Thus, prevailing wage

103. Id. at 1192-93 (emphasis added)(footnotes omitted).

104. See id. at 1192 nn.3-5.
105. See Kilberg & Inman, supra note 69.
106. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 165-5. Public work is defined as:

[C]onstruction, reconstruction, demolition, alteration and/or repair work other than
maintenance work, done under contract and paid for in whole or in part out of the
funds of a public body where the estimated cost of the total project is in excess of
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), but shall not include work performed under
a rehabilitation or manpower training program.
Id. at § 165-2(5).
107. The Prevailing Wage Act contains additional regulations promulgated under 34 PA.
CODE §§ 9.101-9.112.
108. The phrase "contributions for employe benefits" is defined as: "'Fringe benefits' paid

or to be paid, including payment made whether directly or indirectly, to the workmen for
sick, disability, death, other than Workmen's Compensation, medical, surgical, hospital,

vacation, travel expense, retirement and pension benefits." Id. § 9.102.
109. Id.
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rates are unique to specific classifications of workers in a given
locality, and include both the amount of cash wages paid to
employees and the contribution to employee benefit plans.
According to the PWA, the Secretary of Labor and Industry
for Pennsylvania is responsible for determining the prevailing wage
for each locality in which the projects are performed and for each
craft or classification of workers doing work on the project."' To
make this determination, the Secretary may consult numerous
sources, including wage and employee benefit rates established
under collective bargaining agreements. 1 ' Prospective bidders on

110. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 165-7.
111. The Pennsylvania Code lists the sources that the Secretary may consult to determine
the general prevailing minimum wage rates.
(a) For the purpose of making a determination of the general prevailing minimum
wage rates in the locality in which the public work is to be performed for each
craft or classification during the anticipated term of the contract, the Secretary
may ascertain and consider the wage rates and employe benefits established by
collective bargaining agreements.
(b) If a bona fide collective bargaining agreement has expired by the terms
thereof, the Secretary may ascertain and consider the wage rates and employe
benefits established thereby until a new bona fide collective bargaining agreement,
as defined in § 9.102 (relating to definitions), has been executed.
(c) The Secretary may also consider the following:
(1) Information obtained from Federal agencies charged with the
administration of labor standards provisions of Federal acts applicable to contracts
covering contractors and subcontractors on public building and public work and
on building and work financed in whole or in part by loans and grants of the
United States, within the locality.
(2) The number of skilled, competent and experienced workmen within the
locality who are generally available for employment on public work.
(3) Statements signed and certified by contractors and subcontractors and
union representatives showing wage rates paid on projects, within the locality....
(4) Other information pertinent to the determination of prevailing minimum
wage rates.
(d) The Secretary will conduct a continuing program for obtaining and compiling
of wage rate information and shall encourage the voluntary submission of wage
rate data by contractors, contractors' associations, labor organizations, public
officials and other interested parties, reflecting wage rates paid to workmen in the
various types of construction in the locality. Rates shall be determined for varying
types of projects within the entire range of work performed by the building and
construction industry. Information submitted shall reflect not only the specified
wage rate or rates paid to a particular craft in the locality but also the type or
types of construction on which the wage rate or rates have been paid. If the
Secretary deems that the data at hand is insufficient to make a determination with
respect to the crafts or classifications necessary to perform the proposed public
work, he may have a field survey conducted by his staff representative for the
purpose of obtaining additional information upon which to make a determination
of the wage rates, and also the customs, usages and practices as to the type of
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public work projects, any representative of a group of contractors
engaged in certain types of construction, any representative of a
craft or classification of workers, or the "public body" may request2
review of the final wage rate determination by filing a petition.1
This filing is followed by an investigation and public hearing by the
Secretary to review the final wage determination. 3
Once the wage rate is established, employers who are awarded
public contracts must guarantee that they will pay the prevailing
wage to workers" 4 and have a duty to post the general prevailing
minimum wage rates on their worksites to inform workers of their
wage and benefit rights under the Act."5 The public body is
charged with certifying that employers have paid the prevailing
wage rate to workers on the project." 6 If the public body fails to
identify noncompliance by contractors, workers are permitted to
file a protest with the Secretary objecting to the payment." 7 The
Secretary, in turn, may direct those in the public body in charge of
the disbursement of funds to deduct from the public body's
payment to the contractor the amount owed to employees on the
'
project. 18
The public body holds this amount for the benefit of
the workers and may pay that sum to the workers directly."9

work to which the wage rates apply and the size of available force of qualified
workmen within the locality in which the public work is to be performed.
34 PA. CODE § 9.105.
112. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 165-8. For purposes of the PWA, the public body "means
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, any of its political subdivisions, any authority created
by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and any instrumentality or
agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." Id. § 165-2(4).
113. Id. § 165-8.
114. 34 PA. CODE § 9.103(1). Contracts with employees must:
[P]rovide that the contractor shall pay at least the wage rates as determined in the
decision of the Secretary of Labor and Industry and shall comply with the
conditions of the act approved August 15, 1961, and the regulations issued thereto,
to assure the full and proper payment of the rates.
Id. Section 9.103 contains numerous other provisions required to be placed in contracts for
public work, which are omitted from this Comment.
115. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 165-9.
116. Id. § 165-10(a).
117. 34 PA. CODE § 9.103(7)(v).
118. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 165-10(b).
119. Id.
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If the Secretary determines that an employer's failure to pay
prevailing wages was intentional, 1" the Secretary must notify all
public bodies of:
[T]he name or names of such persons or firms and no contract
shall be awarded to such persons or firms or to any firm,
corporation or partnership in which such persons or firms have
an interest until three years have elapsed from the date of the
notice to the public bodies aforesaid. 12
The contractor will be liable to the Commonwealth for liquidated
damages as well as damages for breach of contract in the amount
of underpayment of the wages that were due to workers under the
contract. 122 Employers found to have unintentionally failed to
pay the prevailing wage rate are afforded an opportunity to make
the appropriate payments or to provide security for the amount
required to be paid."z
B. The Source of ERISA Preemption Controversy

Like other states prevailing wage laws, the PWA has been
threatened with ERISA preemption. The source of the PWA's
vulnerability to ERISA preemption is rooted in the Act's requirement that employers pay not only the prevailing cash wage to
employees but prevailing fringe benefits as well. Hence, the fringe
benefits component of the PWA has become the focal point with
respect to ERISA preemption.
Pennsylvania has recently changed the requirements for
compliance with the fringe benefits component of the prevailing
wage law. Until April 1992,124 Pennsylvania utilized a line-item
120. Evidence of an intentional failure to pay the prevailing wage rate includes:
(1) Any acts of omission or commission done willfully or with a knowing disregard of
the rights of workmen resulting in the payment of less than prevailing wage rates.
(2) After there has been a finding by the secretary in the manner required by this
section that any person or firm has failed to pay the prevailing wages prescribed by this act
and thereafter there shall be a failure by such person or firm to pay the prevailing wages
prescribed by this act, or there shall be a subsequent failure of such person or firm to comply
with any opportunity to adjust any differences which shall be afforded him by the secretary.
Id. § 165-11(h).
121. Id. § 165-11(e).
122. Id. § 165-11(0.
123. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43 § 165-11(d).
124. The Prevailing Wage Appeals Board issued a Declaratory Order on April 13, 1992,
which explicitly rejected the line-time approach to determine compliance with the prevailing
wage minimums. Telephone interview with Roger Bitzel, Director of the Prevailing Wage
Division of the Department of Labor and Industry of Pennsylvania (Oct. 27, 1994)
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approach to determine the level of wages and benefits to be paid
by an employer. Under this approach, employers were required to
pay a cash wage and to pay into specific benefit categories
determined to be prevailing in that locality. If an employer did not
carry that benefit program or was obligated under contract to pay
into another benefit plan, the employer was required to substitute
cash for his or her contribution to the benefit plan specified in the
prevailing wage rate. For example, in a locality in which the
prevailing wage was $10 in cash wages, $2 in health benefits, and
$2 in pension benefits, an employer was permitted to substitute
cash for the benefits but would not receive credit under PWA for
paying into fringe benefit plans other than those required by the
prevailing wage determination. Thus, if an employer paid $10 in
cash wages and $4 in disability benefits, she would receive credit
for her contribution into the disability benefit category, which was
not considered to be prevailing. Moreover, she would be required
to provide an additional $4 in cash wages, above the cash wage
already paid, as a substitute for her failure to provide the prevailing
contributions for health and pension benefits.
The effects of such restrictions on employer contributions to
employee benefits packages were quite costly on employees. For
example, in Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Department of Labor &
Industry,1" the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
a decision by the Prevailing Wage Appeals Board, which held that
a contractor's payment into fringe benefit plans above the maximum amount determined to be prevailing in the locality could not
relieve him of his obligation to pay into other benefit categories as
determined under the Act. The court stated:
Based upon prior secretary decisions, the Secretary in this
instance has determined that fringe benefit credits are only
recognized in the Predetermination up to the maximum amount
of the predetermined fringe benefits rate. Any fringe benefits
paid in a specific category over and above the maximum
amount listed in the Predetermination is only done so at the
discretion of the employer.2 6

[hereinafter Interview]. Other provisions of the order will be discussed infra note 134.
125. 598 A.2d 1065 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
126. Id. at 1068.
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As a result, the employer was not permitted to make up deficiencies in his contributions to the prevailing benefit
programs despite
127
his overpayment in other benefit categories.

In response to the fear that such a restrictive approach would
not survive a preemption challenge," z the Prevailing Wage
Appeals Board issued a declaratory order abolishing the line-item
approach for determining employer contributions to employee
benefits. Under this order, employers may choose the benefit plans
to which they will contribute as long as the employer satisfies the
established minimum predetermination for fringe benefits.1 29 The

declaratory order "requires contractors to separately examine and
meet the wage and fringe benefit components of the prevailing
wage determination. Thus, the maximum credit an employer may
take for employee benefits may not exceed the total contributions
for the employee benefits established by the predetermination." 3 '
Hence, the order substituted the line-item approach for an
alternative method that gives credit for employer-chosen benefit
programs.131

127. Id.
128. Interview, supra note 124.
129. Id.
130. Keystone v. Foley, 837 F. Supp. 654, 656 (1993), rev'd, 37 F.3d 945 (1994), cert.
denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 2244 (Mar. 29, 1995). The court in Foley described how the new
prevailing wage specifications may be satisfied:
Under the Act, for a specific project, the Secretary may determine the prevailing
rate to be $20 an hour in wages and $5 an hour in fringe benefits. If an employer,
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, pays employees $16 an hour in
wages and $10 an hour in fringe benefits, however, it receives no credit for the
higher payment in benefits. Under this example, the employer would be obligated
to provide an additional $4 per hour in wages in order to be in compliance under
the Act.
Id. at 656.
131. The Declaratory Order stated:
4. ... That credit for contributions for employee benefits, up to the
maximum established by the predetermination, shall be given as follows:
d) Contributions which exceed the predetermined rate in any employee benefit
category shall be credited in any other predetermined benefit category (or
categories) for which the predetermined rate has not been satisfied;
e) Credit shall be given for contributions for employee benefits not included in the
predetermined benefit categories;
Q The maximum credit for contributions for employee benefits shall not exceed
the total amount of contributions for employee benefits established by predetermination;
Foley, 37 F.3d at 952.
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Despite this change in the requirements for satisfaction of the
benefits component, critics contend that any requirement to pay a
prevailing rate of benefits is detrimental to workers and is preempted by ERISA. In his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee
on Labor, Mark Thierman, speaking on behalf of National
Association of Manufacturers, stated:
In effect, the Pennsylvania Act[,] by not giving credit for
benefits actually paid, discourages a contractor from making
benefit contributions beyond predetermined levels and dictates
or restricts the level of benefits paid to workers. This type of
state statutory scheme contradicts the goal of Congress in
enacting ERISA in that it leads to a patchwork scheme of
regulation subjecting employers to conflicting and inconsistent
state and local regulation and making it impossible for a
company ... which operate[s] nationwide to have uniform or

centrally administered benefit
plans which function simulta1 32
neously in different states.
Requiring employers to pay a certain level of benefits interferes
with the freedom to contract with employee groups for certain
wages and benefits. Employers who are contractually bound to pay
a level of benefits higher than those required under the PWA are
forced to pay an inflated wage to employees on public works
contracts. Government regulation of this area not only interferes
with the bargaining agreements entered into between employer and
employee groups, but also runs contrary to congressional intent to
promote uniformity in the regulation of benefit plans.133 As will
be discussed in the next section, despite these effects, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the PWA
was not preempted by ERISA, thereby permitting State intrusion
upon an employer's ability to maintain uniform benefits programs
for employees.
V. Pennsylvania's Prevailing Wage Act and ERISA Preemption
A. Keystone v. Foley

On July 30, 1993 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania held that the PWA, its accompanying regulations, and the Declaratory Order issued on April 13,

132. Hearings on S. 1580, supra note 29 (statement of Mark Thierman).
133. See discussion supra part III.B.
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1992,34 were preempted by ERISA. 35 In separate actions,
plaintiffs Keystone Chapter Associated Builders and Contractors of
Pennsylvania, Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, and the
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, filed complaints
alleging 13that
Pennsylvania's prevailing wage law was preempted by
6
ERISA.

To begin its preemption analysis, the court recognized that
ERISA preemption "is deliberately expansive and 'conspicuous for
its breadth.' ' 137 The court's first examined whether the PWA

"related to" an ERISA benefits plan.138

Based on the test

enunciated in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, the court determined that the
PWA was sufficiently 9related to an ERISA benefits plan so as to
13

warrant preemption.
The court reasoned that since the PWA requires an employer
to calculate wages and benefits according to an administrative
scheme "[t]he Act .

..

imposes on-going administrative burdens

that fall within the parameters of ERISA plans."'" Moreover,
the court determined that the PWA may affect the level of benefits
paid to employees because employers do not receive credit for
benefits paid above the predetermined prevailing rate for that
locality. 4 '

Denying the employer credit for contributions into

other benefits categories, may, in turn, discourage the payment of
benefits above the level set by the prevailing wage."4 The court
found that the effect of the PWA is to "'dictate or restrict the
choices of ERISA plans with regard to . . . benefits.' ' , 4 3 As a

134. The Declaratory Order, among other provisions, stated that contribution to the
fringe benefits portion of the prevailing wage "is bona fide if that contribution: (a) is made
to an "employee benefit plan" or a fund or program subject to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974."' Foley, 837 F. Supp. at 656. Such explicit reference to
ERISA benefit plans as bona fide under the PWA prompted the challenge to the order. Id.
135. Id. at 659.
136. Id. at 656.
137. Id. at 657.
138. Foley, 837 F. Supp. at 657.
139. The court stated that in deciding to preempt the PWA, they acted in accordance
with the courts in General Electric Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 891 F.2d 25 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 (1990) and Associated Builders & Contractors v. Baca,
769 F. Supp. 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Foley, 837 at 650. These cases are discussed infra Part
V.
140. Foley, 837 F. Supp. at 658.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown
Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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result, the court held that the PWA, its accompanying regulations,
and the declaratory order were preempted by ERISA. t" Furthermore, the court determined that the benefits component of the
act was not severable from the rest of the Act.'45 Therefore, the
court refused to omit the benefits component of the prevailing
wage determination in order to save the rest of the PWA from
preemption. 4 6 The defendants filed an immediate appeal which
eventually led to a stay of the order declaring the PWA'47 invalid
and unenforceable. 148
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the district court's holding that the PWA was preempted
by ERISA.'49 The court stated that the PWA and its regulations

constitute a traditional area of state regulation, and as a result, a
presumption arises that Congress did not intend to preempt such
a law." ° More importantly, the court concluded that the PWA

"incidental
has only
15 1

and insignificant relations to ERISA

plans.

In arriving at its decision, the court examined whether the
152
PWA and its regulations had a direct relation to ERISA plans.
Using the three-part analysis developed in United Wire, Metal &
Machine Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hospital,

the court concluded that the law did not bear a direct relationship

144. Id. at 658.
145. Foley, 837 F. Supp. at 659.
146. Id. With respect to severability, the court stated:
We do not believe that the portion of the Prevailing Wage Act that calls for
the inclusion of benefits in the prevailing wage determination is severable from the
rest of the Act. Under the Act, the prevailing rate is made up of an hourly wage
rate and an hourly benefit rate. The portion of the rate based on benefits is
interwoven into the Act. A prevailing rate without any allowance for benefits
would be much different from the present system. We believe that the legislature
intended to include a benefit computation in the prevailing rate, and to enforce
the Act without such a computation would be contrary to this legislative intent.
Id. at 659.
147. Interview, supra note 124.
148. Foley, 837 F. Supp. at 659.
149. Foley, 37 F.3d at 963-64.
150. Id. at 956. Although numerous courts have cited fundamental state interests as a
factor to be considered during preemption analysis, "there is no statutory support for this
inquiry... " Kilberg & Inman, supra note 69, at 1320. In fact, this inquiry may "wholly
or partially derive from the inappropriate application of implicit preemption doctrines to
Id. at 1324-25.
I..."
ERISA's express preemption provisions .
151. Foley, 37 F.3d at 956.
152. Id. at 956-57.
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to ERISA. 53 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that
the regulations are not "'specifically designed to affect employee
benefit plans,""' since the PWA is aimed at protecting workers
from substandard pay and does not require that employers pay into
certain benefit plans. 155 Second, the court found that the PWA
and its regulations "do not 'single[] out [ERISA] plans for special
'
treatment,' or even refer to such plans."156
Although the calculation of the prevailing wage involves considering the contribution of
fringe benefits to ERISA plans, the court stated that ERISA does
not mandate preemption when ERISA plans are considered under
those circumstances. 157 Finally, the court considered whether "the
rights or restrictions [the PWA] created are predicated on the
existence of such a plan."' 5 8 The court determined that in the
absence of ERISA plans, the PWA could be meaningfully applied,
thus satisfying the third inquiry for direct relation to ERISA under
United Wire.159
The court then explored whether the cash or benefits components of the PWA bore an indirect relation to ERISA plans, which
would "'dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA plans with regard
to their benefits, structure, reporting and administration,' or 'impair
the ability of a plan to function simultaneously in a number of
states.""'
The court rejected the argument that the cash
minimum required under the Act would disrupt union contracts
negotiated at the national level which may offer higher benefits and
a lower cash wage.161 The appellants argued that the PWA would
force them to pay the benefits according to the contract but would
also require them to pay a higher cash wage for public works
projects. 62 Such a law, the appellants argued, "makes it difficult
for a single plan 'to function simultaneously in a number of
states." ' 163 Yet, the court determined that the cash component of
the PWA does not dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA plans

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 956 (quoting United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192.)
Id.
Foley, 37 F.3d at 956 (quoting United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192).
Id. at 957.
Id. (quoting United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192).
Id.
Id. at 958 (quoting United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1193).
Foley, 37 F.3d at 958-59.
Id. at 958.
Id. (quoting United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1193).
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merely because employers may have negotiated contracts for lower
wages in exchange for greater benefits." The court found that
the PWA, like other wage regulations, may: "[C]onstrain[]
employers' choices regarding wages and non-ERISA benefits, and
could indirectly affect their decisions as to what ERISA benefits to
offer employees. However, wage laws are among the 'many forms
of state regulation under the police power which result in increase
in the cost of doing business."" 65 Thus, the court concluded that
any relation that the cash component of the PWA has to ERISA
benefits plans is tenuous and that preemption of the PWA would
interfere with the state's traditional regulation of wages."6
The court next examined the benefits component of the PWA
and concluded that this component does not bear a direct relation
to ERISA benefits plans:
The provision does not require or encourage an employer to
provide certain benefits, to alter the manner in which it
provides benefits, or even to provide benefits at all. The
benefits .component only relates to ERISA plans when an
employer decides to satisfy it through contributions to ERISA
plans instead of cash payments or contributions to non-ERISA
benefits. Where a legal requirement may be easily satisfied
through means unconnected to ERISA plans, and only relates
to ERISA plans at the election of an employer, it "affects
employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a
manner67 to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the
plan."1
The court noted, however, that they would reach a different
conclusion if Pennsylvania continued to use the line-item approach
to determine which employer credits satisfy the prevailing
wage.1" Since the line-item approach would favor contributions
into specific benefits programs, legislative adoption of such
approach could not be achieved "without relating to ERISA
plans." 69
The court's final inquiry involved whether the PWA and its
regulations "'dictate or restrict the choice of ERISA plans with

164. Id. at 959.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Foley, 37 F.3d at 959 (quoting United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1196).
Id.
Id. at 960 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21).
Id. at 961.
Id.
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The court

decided that only two administrative requirements under the Act
place any burdens on ERISA plans.17 The first relates to the
requirement that the state must certify that contributions to
benefits plans are bona fide, in that they be made to fringe benefits
programs for the exclusive benefit of employees.17 1 The second
requires employers to keep records of their benefit contributions
and certify that they have paid wages and benefits according to the
contract.'73 These requirements, the court determined, create
only a slight burden since calculating and reporting the benefits
paid to workers "will not influence 'decisions regarding the internal
design and structure of benefits plans (e.g. who may collect, and
how, and from whom).""' 74
B. Analysis of Keystone v. Foley

The Third Circuit's decision in Keystone v. Foley, which
rescued Pennsylvania's PWA from ERISA preemption, appears to
contradict the Congressional intent in enacting the preemption
provisions of ERISA. The benefits component of the PWA fails
both the direct relationship and indirect relationship tests as
enunciated in United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare
Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hospital. In particular, the PWA

dictates the level of benefits that employers must pay to employees
on public works projects, regardless of whether employers and
employees have freely negotiated the wage for a particular project.
Since employers do not receive credit for benefits paid above the
level predetermined under the statute, some employers may elect
to offer fewer benefits than they would normally offer to employees. Employers may pursue this solution if they fear they will be
forced to pay additional cash wages to account for the lower cash
wage paid in exchange for higher levels of benefits. Such restrictions on employer choices of payment have a direct effect on
employee benefits, especially when these benefits are particularly
valued by certain employees. Employees who prefer to defer some
of their cash wages in exchange for contributions into pension or

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Foley, 37 F.3d at 962 (quoting United Wire, 995 F. 2d at 1193).
Jd.
Id.
Id. at 962-63.
Id. at 963.
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health plans may be forced to accept smaller contributions to these
benefits if their employers do not receive credit toward the cash
component of the prevailing wage for their overpayment into the
benefits category. In its analysis, the Third Circuit dismissed these
effects upon employee benefits plans and ignored the congressional
intent of ERISA: to promote the availability and utilization of
employee benefits plans.
Furthermore, the regulation of employee benefits plans under
the PWA may discourage the diversification or expansion of benefit
plans offered by contractors, thus triggering ERISA preemption.
Employers may choose to forgo the complex requirements
necessary to establish and administer employee benefits plans if the
benefits component of the PWA can be satisfied by paying its cash
equivalent. As a result, the Act provides a disincentive for
employers to provide diverse employee benefit packages. Thus, the
Act provides a further disincentive for employers to maintain or
establish employee benefits plans, a result that explicitly contradicts
congressional intent under ERISA.
While appearing to return Pennsylvania's PWA to the status
quo, the decision in Keystone v. Foley will have significant effects
on the choices of contractors who bid on projects at the national
level. Employers who bid on projects in a number of states are
likely to shop for the area which is friendliest to that employer's
particular treatment of wages and benefits. Since some employers
offer disproportionately large benefits packages and fewer cash
wages, or vice versa, as part of the contract with employees, states
with prevailing wage laws that do not correspond with their
particular payment arrangement may lose bids from these employers. Thus, employers who are bound by contract to a certain level
of wages and benefits that may not match the prevailing local levels
of wages and benefits will likely refrain from bidding on
Pennsylvania's public works projects. As a result, the declining
number of employers bidding on public works projects will
consequently drive up the price that other construction firms will
demand for these projects. Ultimately, tax payers will be forced to
pay for this price increase as the government shifts the cost of these
public works projects onto them. Hence, in addition to ignoring
the direct effects of the PWA on employee benefit plans, the
decision to uphold the PWA promises to effect Pennsylvania's
economy. While some contractors will receive higher incomes from
the decrease in competition public works projects, it is unlikely that
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the benefits of higher income will be passed on to their employees.
As a result, the constricting effect of a tax increase to pay for the
increased cost of public works projects will more than offset any
positive effect brought about by an increase in employers' disposable income.
These effects become even more disturbing for Pennsylvanians
when the restrictions placed on employers under the Prevailing
Wage Act are compared with the flexibility that has emerged in
states which have ruled that ERISA preempts all or part of their
prevailing wage laws. ERISA preemption of state prevailing wage
laws promotes flexibility in selecting the method of payment for
employees, which consequently will promote the establishment and
maintenance of employee benefits plans. Thus, the decision in
Keystone v. Foley cannot be viewed merely as a return to the status
quo for Pennsylvania. Instead, it must be analyzed vis-d-vis the
effect that preemption of state prevailing wage laws has brought
about in other jurisdictions.
VI. ERISA Preemption of State Prevailing Wage Laws in Other
Jurisdictions
Numerous other jurisdictions confronted with ERISA preemption of state prevailing wage laws have concluded that these laws,
or portions of these laws, are preempted by ERISA. These
disparate results stem from conflicting views about the goals of
ERISA as well as from the application of preemption analysis.
That prevailing wage laws have been fully or partially overturned
in a number of states emphasizes the need for Congress to respond
to these inconsistencies and to clarify the breadth of ERISA's
preemptive effect in the area of prevailing wage laws.
A. Recent Decisions
Two recent decisions decided after Keystone illustrate the
divergence of authority on the issue of ERISA preemption of state
prevailing wage laws. The first, Associated Builders & Contractors
v. Perry,175 rejected the Third Circuit's analysis in Keystone and
found that Michigan's prevailing wage law was preempted by
ERISA. The second, Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders &
176
Contractors,Inc. v. Minnesota Department of Labor & Industry,

175. 869 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
176. 47 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 1995).
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upheld Minnesota's prevailing wage law and explicitly adopted the
court's reasoning in Keystone.
In Perry, the court for the Eastern District of Michigan
examined whether a Michigan law, requiring that non-union
construction companies pay union wages on state-financed
construction projects, was preempted by ERISA' 7 7 Under the
Michigan prevailing wage law, the prevailing rate was determined
by surveying local construction unions and determining the level of
wages and fringe benefits paid to those workers throughout the
state based on certain union job classifications.178 Based on this
calculation, employers who undertook state-funded projects were
required to enter into binding agreements under which they agreed
to pay the prevailing level of wages and fringe benefits)79
Employers were prohibited from receiving credit for fringe benefits
paid to workers above the prevailing fringe benefits level.180
Moreover, employers were required to keep records of the wages
and benefits paid to employees and to comply with other administrative requirements. 81
The court found that the provisions of Michigan's prevailing
wage law regarding the prohibition against credit for excess benefits
and the on-going administrative requirements "related to" ERISA
plans, and as a result, determined that the Act is preempted by
ERISA. In analyzing the excess benefits cap provision, the court
cited to Associated Builders & Contractors v. Baca."8

In Baca,

the United States District for the Northern Distinct of California
held that a prevailing wage law, which prohibited giving employers
credit toward the prevailing wage for benefits paid above the
prevailing level, was preempted by ERISA because "[b]y limiting
the amount of benefits that could be 'subtracted' from the per diem
wage calculations, the [prevailing wage] resolutions and the
ordinance ...relate to and regulate ERISA plans by discouraging
payment of benefits at higher than prevailing levels."' 83

177. Perry, 869 F. Supp. at 1243.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1243-44.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1244.
182. 769 F. Supp. 1537 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
183. Perry, 869 F. Supp. at 1245 (quoting Baca, 769 F. Supp. at 1548) (alteration in
original).
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The Perry court explicitly rejected the analysis proffered in
Keystone:

The Keystone court did precisely what the Supreme Court
stated it could not do.. . . It engrafted a two-step analysis onto

a one-step statute, first finding that the benefits component of
the prevailing wage act had "some connection" to (i.e., was
related to) employee benefit plans, then finding no preemption
because employers could comply with the law by not paying any
benefits if they paid a sufficiently high cash wage. This court
rejects the Keystone court's two-step analysis.1"
Thus, since the Perry court found that the effect of the excess
benefits cap in Michigan's prevailing wage law was to discourage
benefits 85under ERISA plans, ERISA preempted the Michigan
statute.
The court further attacked Michigan's prevailing wage law to
the extent that the law imposes administrative burdens on employers that relate to ERISA benefit plans.186 Specifically, the court
noted that the prevailing wage law's requirements that employers:
(1) keep records of wages and fringe benefits paid to employees;"8 (2) submit the specifics of their fringe benefits plans in
writing to receive credit under the prevailing benefits component;1 88 (3) comply with rules regarding calculating fringe benefits;189 and (4) be subjected to certain penalties for misconduct in
the administration of these plans, constituted direct regulation of
ERISA plans."9 As a result, the court found that the administrative requirements under the law "related to" ERISA plans, and
therefore, ERISA preempted Michigan's prevailing Wage Act.
As additional support for this conclusion, the court referred to
congressional intent regarding the ability of ERISA plans to
operate in multiple states.191 The court determined that because
numerous states could enact prevailing wage laws with different
administrative requirements, allowing such a law to stand "'would
impair the ability of a[n ERISA] plan to function simultaneously in

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id. at 1248.
Id.
Perry, 869 F. Supp. at 1248.

189. Id. at 1249.

190. Id.
191. Id.
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thereby contradicting the intent of

Congress in enacting ERISA. 93
The court in Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders &
Contractors v. Minnesota Department of Labor & Industry94
reached a different conclusion with respect to ERISA preemption
of Minnesota's prevailing wage law. While the Minnesota law
requires contractors on state-financed construction projects to pay
the prevailing wage rate, employers are not subjected to an excess
benefits cap like that found under the Michigan and Pennsylvania
prevailing wage laws.' 95 Thus, an employer "can divide the
amount between wages and benefits as it chooses, so long as the
''
combined total meets or exceeds the prevailing wage rate. 19
Consequently, employers are not restricted to paying a specified
level of wages and benefits but may use the amount they currently
pay under either category to meet their responsibility to pay the
prevailing wage. The court found that the obligation to utilize an
hourly calculation for benefits, the administrative record keeping
obligation, and the costs associated with those requirements
impacted ERISA plans in such a way that was "too 'tenuous,
remote [and] peripheral' to lead to preemption." ' 9
The distinction between the requirements under the law
upheld in Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors
and Pennsylvania's PWA is crucial. Unlike Pennsylvania's law, the
Minnesota law provides flexibility to employers who bid on public
projects. Employers have no disincentive under the Minnesota law
to refrain from bidding on these projects because the Minnesota
law provides credit for employers who pay a certain level of
benefits and wages and does not force employers to meet the
specified wage rate by analyzing their contribution to wages and
benefits separately. Thus, under Minnesota law, employers who
have a level of wages and benefits predetermined by contract may
receive credit for these pre-determined levels. Such a requirement
does not dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA plans because
employers are merely required to pay what is essentially a

192. Id. (quoting United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown
Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1193 (3d Cir. 1993)).
193. Perry, 869 F. Supp. at 1249.
194. 47 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 1995).
195. See id. at 977, 979.
196. Id. at 977.
197. Id. at 978-79 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air.Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
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minimum wage which can include payments of wages and benefits.
This differs significantly from Pennsylvania's law in that employers
currently receive no credit toward Pennsylvania's prevailing wage
for payments that exceed the level required under either the wage
or benefits category. These restrictions on employer choices of
wages and benefits levels represent precisely what ERISA was
intended to prevent and, therefore, should be preempted by
ERISA.
B. New York's Prevailing Wage Law
In General Electric v. New York State Dep't of Labor,'98 the
Second Circuit held that the portion of New York's prevailing wage
law regarding supplements was preempted by ERISA. Like
Pennsylvania's Prevailing Wage Act, the prevailing wage portion of
the New York Labor Law199 was enacted to "insure that employees on public works [are] paid wages equivalent to the prevailing
rate of similarly employed workers in the locality." 20° The law
provides that workers on public works projects shall not be paid
less than the prevailing wage for workers in the locality for a legal
day's work. 01
New York's prevailing wage law, as originally written, provided
that, in addition to a prevailing cash wage, contractors on public
works projects were required to pay supplements, which include
"all remuneration for employment paid in any medium other than
cash, or reimbursement for expenses, or any payments which are
not 'wages' within the meaning of the law, including . . . health,

welfare, nonoccupational disability, retirement, vacation benefits,
holiday pay and life insurance." 2' This section was added to the
198. 891 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 (1990). This decision prompted
the introduction of H.R. 1036, 103rd Congress, 1st Sess., which was designed to overturn the
decision in General Electric as well as to prevent other states from losing their prevailing
wage laws to ERISA preemption. Hearing on H.R. 1036, supra note 36, at 30 (statement of
Mark Thierman). H.R. 1036 will be discussed infra part VII of this Comment.
199. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220 (McKinney 1956).
200. General Electric, 891 F.2d at 28.
201. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220 (3). The prevailing wage is defined as:
[T]he rate of wage paid in the locality ... by virtue of collective bargaining
agreements between bona fide labor organizations and employers of the private
sector, performing public or private work provided that said employers employ at
least thirty per centum of workers, laborers or mechanics in the same trade or
occupation in the locality where the work is being performed.
Id. § 220(5)(a).
202. Id. § 220(5)(b).
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law in order to equalize bidding between contractors for public
works projects since employers who paid no fringe benefits to
employees could underbid employers who did. As a result,
employers were to provide supplements according to the prevailing
practices in the locality.2 3
Employers who did not provide benefits according to the
prevailing practices in the locality were able to satisfy the supplements requirement by supplying the employee "with the cash
equivalent of the cost of obtaining the prevailing benefits or by
providing an equivalent benefits plan, or by a combination of
benefits and cash equal to the cost of prevailing benefits.""' 4
Employers were not permitted to substitute payment into other
benefit programs in lieu of payment into the prevailing supplements
programs or their cash equivalent.' 5 Thus, like Pennsylvania,
employers received no credit under the statute for providing
benefits that were not determined to be prevailing in the locality.
Given the restrictions placed upon employers' choices with
respect to the benefit plans they could provide, the supplements
portion of the New York Labor Law was challenged under ERISA.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the law
satisfied all three requirements for preemption, in that the law
"prescribe[d] either the type and amount of an employer's
contributions to a plan; the rules and regulations under which the
plan operates; or the nature and amount of the benefits provided
thereunder."'" ° Like those in Pennsylvania, employers in New
York were cited for violations if they failed to "bring their ...
plans into conformity with those prevailing in the locality.

. .

or to

make up the difference through cash payments to their employees."'" ° This cash payment represented what it cost an employer
to conform with the prevailing benefits plan in the locality.2 "
The Second Circuit determined that such a restriction on the type
of benefits that employers could provide justified preemption under
ERISA.' 9

203.
204.
N.E.2d
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. § 220(3).
General Electric, 891 F.2d at 28 (quoting Action Elec. Contractors v. Goldin, 474
601, 602 (NY 1984)).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
General Electric, 891 F.2d at 29.
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Subsequent to the General Electric decision, the Second Circuit
was confronted with the issue of whether preemption of the
supplements provisions of the New York Labor Law rendered
New York's entire prevailing wage law preempted by ERISA.21°
The court inquired into whether the supplements provisions of the
law could be severed from the remaining portions of the Act in
order to avoid preemption of New York's entire prevailing wage
law.21' To determine severability, the court examined the legislative history behind New York's prevailing wage law and determined that the purpose of the Act was to protect workers on public
projects from substandard wages."1 While the original Act made
no reference to fringe benefits, the legislature found that employers
who did not offer benefits to employees were in a position to
underbid those that did. 13 As a result, the legislature added the
section regarding supplements in 1956 to put "all bidders on an
The Second Circuit determined that the
even footing., 214
prevailing wage law could continue and "'will continue to promote
the goal of maintaining adequate wages on public works projects
9,1215

Although the court found that the supplements provisions were
not crucial to the applicability of the prevailing wage law, the court
determined that severability of the ERISA from the non-ERISA
benefits component of the supplements provisions would save the
entire supplements section from preemption.216 Severing ERISA
from non-ERISA benefits programs essentially means that an
employer who pays health benefits through an ERISA benefit plan
is exempt from paying supplements under the prevailing wage
law. 217 However, an employer who pays the same health benefits
without including them in an ERISA plan "will be forced to pay
the full prevailing rate of benefits set by reference to collective
bargaining agreements in the locality."28 As a result, the bar-

210. General Elec. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1460 (2d Cir. 1991).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1461.
213. Id.
214. Id. (quoting General Elec. v. New York State Dep't. of Labor, 891, F.2d 25, 28 (2d
Cir. 1989)).
215. GeneralElectric, 936 F.2d at 1461 (quoting General Elec. v. New York State Dep't
of Labor, 698 F. Supp. 1093, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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gaining position with respect to public works projects will be more
favorable for employers who pay benefits through an ERISA plan
since they are not subject to the prevailing wage. 9 Such an
outcome was not troublesome to the court, however, because:
Forcing employers without ERISA plans to pay the prevailing
rate for these supplements will mean employees in public works
contracts will be paid more overall than they would be if we
were to invalidate the entirety of the supplements provisions.
Hence it is less likely that they will be paid below the prevailing
rate, which is the primary evil the statute sought to remedy. In
this respect the general purpose of § 220 would be served.220
While this outcome may promote the purpose of the prevailing
wage law, the end result appears to favor ERISA benefits plans.
In Pennsylvania, the Declaratory Order, which explicitly stated
that ERISA plans were considered bona fide for the purposes of
determining the benefits component of the prevailing wage law, was
preempted because of the special treatment afforded ERISA plans.
Similarly, the decision by the court in General Electric to subject
only those employers with non-ERISA benefit plans to the
supplements requirements under the prevailing wage law seems to
afford ERISA plans the same special treatment, thus triggering
preemption under ERISA. Employers who negotiate contracts on
a nationwide level with their employees and have included
employee benefits through an ERISA plan will be faced with
different requirements in Pennsylvania than in New York. This
results from each state's different interpretation of their own
prevailing wage laws. For example, in Pennsylvania, such contributions to ERISA plans will be included in the calculation of the
benefits component of the prevailing wage. If the payments do not
match those at the prevailing local level, the employer is forced to
make up the difference in cash. In New York, on the other hand,
employers whose benefits are paid through an ERISA plan will not
be required to make up the difference between the contract rate of
benefits and prevailing rate of benefits in the locality. As a result,
workers in New York and Pennsylvania may experience large
disparities in wages. In addition, many smaller construction firms
may be excluded from bidding on public works projects in certain
states depending on the state's treatment of an employer's
219. Id.
220. General Electric, 936 F.2d at 1461.
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predetermined level of fringe benefits. If an employer does not
have the money to pay for benefits above those set in an employment contract, that employer will likely be excluded from bidding
on public works projects in Pennsylvania but may find New York's
law friendlier if that employer provides benefits through an ERISA
plan. These effects seem to undermine ERISA's goal "to prevent
conflicting state laws from
affecting employers' ability to maintain
221
uniform benefit plans.
C. Washington's Prevailing Wage Law
Parties to national contracts experience further confusion when
faced with states which have held that ERISA preempts their
prevailing wage laws entirely. In Local Union 598, Plumbers &
Pipefitters Indus. Journeymen & Apprentices Training Fund v. JA.
Jones Constr. Co.,222 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that Washington's prevailing wage statute was preempted by
ERISA "insofar as it mandates a particular level of contributions
by employers to employee benefit plans. ' '21 Under Washington's
law, which was modeled after the Davis-Bacon Act,224 workers on
public works projects may not be paid less than the prevailing wage
in the locality in which the work is performed. 2 z Washington law
defines the prevailing wage rate as "'the rate of hourly wage, usual
benefits, and overtime paid in the 226
locality' to a 'majority' of those
trade.,
or
occupation
same
the
in
Using the test enumerated in Martori Bros. Distrib. v. JamesMassengale,227 the court evaluated whether the prevailing wage
law relates to an ERISA plan, and "'purports to regulate, directly
or indirectly' employee benefit plans" by reaching the terms or
conditions of the plan.228 The court concluded that Washington's
prevailing wage statute fell into a category of state laws that was
preempted by ERISA, because the law created funding requirements for employee benefit plans. 229 Since employer contribu221. Hearings on S. 1580, supra note 29 (statement of Mark Thierman).
222. 846 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1988), affd mem., 488 U.S. 881 (1988).
223. Id.
224. See supra part II.A.
225. Local Union 598, 846 F.2d at 1216.
226. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 39.12.010(1)).
227. 781 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1986).
228. Local Union 598, 846 F.2d at 1218 (quoting MartoriBros., 781 F.2d at 1356).
229. Id. In MartoriBros., the Ninth Circuit enumerated four categories of state laws that
are preempted by ERISA:
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tions to benefit plans like ERISA, are essential to the survival of
such plans, the Ninth Circuit held that "[a] statute which mandates

employer contributions to benefit plans and which effectively
dictates the level at which those required contributions must be
made has a most direct connection with an employee benefit
plan."23 Thus, unlike the Third Circuit decision in Keystone, the
court in Local Union 598 held that Washington's prevailing wage
law relates231to an ERISA plan thereby invoking preemption of the
state law.
So ruling, the Ninth Circuit discussed the policy behind

preemption of statutes that effect employer contributions to benefit
plans. In particular, the court stated that preemption:
[S]erves the Congressional purpose of "eliminating the threat of
conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans." This is particularly important in circumstances where, as in this case, employers have entered into collective
bargaining agreements with national unions to make payments
into inter-state employee benefit plans. State interference with
such national arrangements is foreclosed by the ERISA
preemption clause.232
Thus, the Ninth Circuit argued that state interference with

contributions to employee benefit plans should result in preemption
under ERISA because such interference disrupts the uniformity
encouraged under ERISA.
D. Local Prevailing Wage Laws
To justify preemption of local prevailing wage laws, other
courts have cited the breadth of ERISA preemption and Congress'
intent to have exclusive authority over employee benefit plans. For
example, in City of Des Moines v. Master Builders,23 the Supreme
Court of Iowa held that ERISA preempted a local ordinance which

First, laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of ERISA plans. Second,
laws that create reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting requirements for ERISA
plans. Third, laws that provide rules for the calculation of the amount of benefits
to be paid under ERISA plans. Fourth, laws and common-law rules that provide
remedies for misconduct growing out of the administration of the ERISA plan.
Local Union 598, 846 F.2d at 1218 (quoting Martori Bros., 781 F.2d at 1357).
230. Id. at 1219.
231. Id. at 1221.
232. Id. at 1220 (citation omitted).
233. 498 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1993).
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provided that employees on public improvement contracts over
$25,0002 be paid the prevailing wage and fringe benefits as
determined under the Davis-Bacon Act. 235 The court determined
that the local ordinance, which requires the payment of fringe
benefits according to the prevailing local level, is preempted by
ERISA due to its regulation of such plans. 236 The court reasoned
that Congress' intent to prevent state encroachment into employee
benefit plans justified preemption since regulation of such plans "is
an area reserved for federal authorities alone .....

VII. Legislative Response
On February 23, 1993, Representative Howard L. Berman
introduced legislation before the House of Representatives that
attempted to put an end to the confusion surrounding the interplay
between ERISA and state prevailing wage laws. 238 Although this
bill never emerged from Senate committees, an analysis of its
provisions may provide insight into future attempts to resolve this
issue.
The 1993 bill proposed to amend ERISA to exclude from
preemption:
[A]ny provision of State law to the extent that such provision
requires the payment of prevailing wages, including employee
benefits, on public projects and permits any prevailing employee
benefit plan contribution or cost requirement of such law to be
met by crediting-(i) the payment of employee benefit plan
contributions or cost, (ii) the payment of wages in lieu of such
contributions or costs, or (iii) the payment of a combination of
239
wages and such contributions or costs ....

234. Id. at 703.
235. Id. at 705.

236. Id. at 705-06.
237. Id.

238. H.R. 1036, 103d Congress, 1st Sess. (1993). This bill passed in the House on
November 9, 1993 by a vote of 276 to 150 (D 239-16; R 27-134). The bill was then presented
to the Senate as S.1580, 103d Congress, 2d Sess., and was sponsored by Senators Arlen
Spector (R-Pa) and Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY). The bill was reported favorably from the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources on April 13, 1994, and presented to the
Senate for consideration on July 1, 1994.
239. H.R. 1036 § 1.
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This amendment to ERISA would not affect the preemption of
laws that mandate the maintenance of, or otherwise regulate,
employee benefit plans.2"
Supporters of this amendment to ERISA argued that the bill
clarified Congress' intent not to include prevailing wage laws
among those laws preempted by ERISA. In his speech before the
AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Department, Robert
Georgine remarked:
Non-union contractors are using this so-called ERISA preemption to deprive workers on public projects of the benefits
that prevail in their communities. ERISA wasn't intended to be
used as a way to take benefits away from workers. ERISA
wasn't intended to put a cap on the benefits that people receive.
There is no way we can accept the notion that ERISA preempts stronger standards set by states and localities.241
Georgine argued that ERISA was not enacted to preempt state
laws that provide further protection to workers by requiring the
payment of a certain level of wages and benefits to those workers.
An outcome such as this, stripping employees of benefits protection, appears to undermine the goals of ERISA.
Other supporters, including Pennsylvania's former Secretary of
Labor and Industry, Tom Foley, argued that ERISA preemption
has become too far-reaching in its effects on state prevailing wage
law.242 Without the aid of these laws, Foley argued, contractors
will not be provided with a level playing field in bidding for public
works projects.24 3 In addition, Foley stated that the bill is necessary to clarify the congressional intent behind ERISA, since "the
ERISA preemption provision was designed to eliminate State
attempts to 'regulate' employee benefit plans, not to proscribe or
weaken State prevailing wage laws." 2 "

240. See id.
241. Remarks by Robert Georgine,PresidentBuildingand ConstructionTrades-Legislative
Conference to the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trade Dep't, Federal News Service,
March 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Legs Library, Allnws File. In his remarks, Robert
Georgine refers to the original bill addressing ERISA preemption of state prevailing wage
laws which was defeated by Congress in 1992. See H.R. 2782, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
242. Hearing on H.R. 1036, supra note 36, at 21 (statement of Thomas P. Foley, former
Secretary of Labor and Industry, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania).
243. Id.
244. Id.
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Other proponents of the amendment argued that ERISA
preemption of state prevailing wage laws places local contractors
who include benefits plans for their employees at a competitive
disadvantage in the bidding process.2 45 This is because employers
who do not offer such benefits have lower labor
costs and are able
246
employers.
local
other
of
bids
the
to undercut
States' rights supporters asserted that ERISA preemption of
state prevailing wage laws disrupts the balance between federal and
state powers.2 47 According to this argument, Congress never
intended to prevent states from "setting the terms and conditions
under which it will procure goods, services or other work. There
is no indication that Congress intended ERISA to restrict the
States' freedom to contract on public projects.""24 Consequently,
supporters of the amendment asserted that ERISA preemption of
prevailing wage laws encroaches upon the public policy and police
powers of the states.
Opponents of the amendment argued that the bill contradicts
ERISA's stated goals. Testifying before the House sub-committee
on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers, Mark
Thierman stated that eliminating ERISA preemption over state
prevailing wage laws would force companies to comply with
differing state regulations, thereby making the cost of compliance
with those laws "administratively and financially impossible" for
companies with multi-state operations.2 49 The high costs of
compliance may, in turn, lead employers to provide fewer and less
generous benefits to employees." Thierman stated:
[I]f a contractor is a union signatory he may have a higher
benefit load because he negotiated it, let him come into
Alabama where there is no benefit load and let him get full
credit for those benefits. Let him go from State to State to
State and carry benefits with him so his people have continuity
of employment and continuity of benefits. Give him full credit
- full credit for all the benefits, whether they be prevailing or
not in his area.251

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 11 (statement of Robert A. Georgine).
Id.
Hearingon H.R. 1036, supra note 36, at 14 (statement of Robert Georgine).
Id.
Id. at 31 (statement of Mark Thierman).
Id.
Id. at 27.
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ERISA's regulations ensure that employers providing benefit plans
follow strict guidelines to assure that employee benefits are
protected from mismanagement. In the interim, ERISA encourages employer contributions to benefit programs by providing
uniform federal regulation of ERISA plans. As a result, benefits
programs that have been negotiated and which are protected by
ERISA should be given full credit under state prevailing wage laws.
If not, employers with wage packages that do not correspond to
state prevailing wage determinations will not travel to states where
benefits are prevailing. Ultimately, this situation effects employers'
mobility. Thus, subjecting employers to a multitude of state laws
regulating wages and benefits undermines ERISA's attempts at
providing uniform regulation of employee benefit plans.
VIII. Conclusion
While the proposed amendment to ERISA ultimately died in
Senate committee, its attempt to address the inconsistent court
decisions in the area of ERISA preemption of state prevailing wage
laws is both necessary and instructive. However, despite Congress'
intention to quell the inconsistencies in this area, the bill, as
written, would undoubtedly have led to more confusion and
litigation. The bill proposed to exclude all prevailing wage laws
from ERISA preemption without consideration of how these laws
are applied by the states. Specifically, the legislation did not
address whether states like Pennsylvania may revert back to the use
of a line-item approach to determine the benefits component of its
prevailing wage law. Moreover, it is unclear under the language of
the original bill whether states could dictate not only how much
employers must contribute to benefit plans, but into which benefit
plans they must contribute.
The Third Circuit already has indicated that if forced to rule
on the issue of line-time requirements for employers, it will likely
determine that ERISA preempts such tailored restrictions on
employer choices of benefit plans. Any future amendment to
ERISA similar to that previously proposed would leave
Pennsylvania's employers in a curious situation. If courts determine that such a bill would permit extensive state regulation of
employer contributions to benefit plans, employers may be forced
to drop some of their benefit plans to conform to prevailing benefit
plans in certain localities. As a result, employers may choose to
satisfy the benefits component of prevailing wage laws by paying its
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cash equivalent. Paying the cash equivalent not only affects
employees who may prefer payment through contribution to
employee benefits, but it also directly undermines ERISA's attempt
to foster growth in the area of employee benefits. Any future
amendment to ERISA must clearly define the extent to which the
states may regulate the payment of wages and benefits. Any future
amendment must recognize that granting the states broad power to
regulate contributions to employee benefit plans may result in
employers offering less diverse benefits packages or deciding to
forgo the payment of benefits altogether if they are permitted to
pay the cash equivalent.
In the interim, Pennsylvania will be forced to suffer the
consequences of Keystone v. Foley, which places Pennsylvania at a
competitive disadvantage vis-d-vis other states whose prevailing
wage laws have been preempted by ERISA. Ideally, Congress will
reexamine its approach to ERISA preemption of state prevailing
wage laws and determine that ERISA preempts such restrictions on
employee benefit plans. If it does not, however, any future
amendments to ERISA should provide more direction to the states
on how to draft their prevailing wage laws so these laws can
function on a national level. Establishing uniform standards will
allow employers to negotiate contracts with employees with some
expectation of what state standards they will be forced to meet
once they bid on public works projects. Furthermore, uniform
regulation of state prevailing wage laws will place state and local
economies on a level playing field in the bidding process for public
works projects.
Beth Hermanson

